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INTRODUCTION 
The acid rain provisions of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, included in 
Title IV, required fossil-fuel-fired electricity generating units to reduce sulfur dioxide 
(SO2) emissions by 50% in two phases. In the first, known as Phase I and extending from 
1995 through 1999, generating units of 100 MWe of capacity and larger, having an SO2 
emission rate in 1985 of 2.5 lbs. per million Btu (#/mmBtu) or higher, were required to 
take a first step and to reduce SO2 emissions to an average of 2.5 #/mmBtu during these 
transitional years. Phase II, which began in 2000 and continues indefinitely, expanded the 
scope of the program by including all fossil-fuel-fired generating units greater than 25 
MWe and increased its stringency by requiring affected units to reduce emissions to an 
average emission rate that would be approximately 1.2 #/mmBtu at average annual heat 
or Btu input in 1985-87, and that would be proportionately lower for increased total 
fossil-fuel fired heat input.2  
The behavior of affected units in Phase I has provided the answers to many 
questions about how tradable permit systems would work in practice: for instance, how 
electric utilities would use allowances and whether reasonably efficient allowance 
markets would develop.  It has also been possible to answer questions about 
environmental effectiveness, patterns of abatement, opt-in behavior, cost savings, and 
                                                 
1  Ellerman is executive director of the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research (CEEPR) at 
MIT and senior lecturer in the Sloan School of Management. The author is indebted to Paul Joskow for 
comments on an earlier draft, to Curtis Carlson and Byron Swift, who commented on the paper at the EPA 
workshop on market-based mechanisms at which the paper was first presented, and to Brice Tariel and 
Florence Dubroeucq for very capable research assistance. Funding by EPA STAR grant award #R-
82863001-0 is gratefully acknowledged.  
2 The nation-wide Phase II cap on SO2 emissions is 8.9 million tons, which is approximately the product of 
total baseline (average 1985-87) heat input and the emission rate target of 1.2 #/mmBtu. Since the cap is 
fixed, higher total heat input necessarily implies a lower average emission rate, and vice versa. 
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innovative activity associated with cap-and-trade programs.3 Yet, the answers to some of 
these questions were necessarily incomplete, while other questions could not be 
addressed until Phase II began, such as: How much additional abatement would be 
provided by the four-fold increase in coverage and the tighter cap?  How would the 
allowances banked in Phase I be used during Phase II?  Was the degree of over-
compliance in Phase I, which led to the accumulation of a large allowance bank, even 
reasonably optimal? Do new generating units, who receive no allowances, face any 
barriers to entry caused by the need to acquire allowances in the market? And finally, 
what will it all cost when the Phase II cap is fully phased in? This paper provides 
tentative answers to these questions based on the analysis of data from the first two years 
of Phase II.   
THE DISTRIBUTION OF ABATEMENT 
Phase 1 and Phase II units 
Any analysis of abatement and compliance must distinguish between those units 
for which 2000 was only the sixth year of being subject to the requirements of Title IV 
and those for which 2000 was the first year.4 Table 1 shows the relevant statistics for 
these two groups of units for the year 2001.  
Table 1. Title IV Compliance Behavior, 2001 
    
 Phase I Units 
(374 Units) 
Significant  
Phase II Units 
(1,420 Units) 
Total 
(1,794 Units) 
Heat Input (trillion Btu) 6,007 (24%) 18,730 24,737 
Emissions (000 tons SO2) 4,041 (38%) 6,571 10,612 
Emission Rate (lbs SO2/mmBtu) 1.35 0.70 0.86 
CF Emissions (000 tons SO2) 9,304 (55%) 7,622 16,926 
Abatement (000 tons SO2) 5,263 (83%) 1,051 6,314 
Allowances (000 tons SO2) 2,914 (32%) 6,199 9,113 
Banking (000 tons SO2) (1,127) (75%) (372) (1,499) 
                                                 
3 The principal works evaluating compliance behavior in Phase I are Burtraw (1996), Carlson et al. (2000), 
Ellerman et al. (2000), Joskow et al. (1998), Montero (1999), Popp (2001), Schmalensee et al. (1998), 
Swift (2000), and Swift (2001). Ellerman (2003) provides an update that includes the first years of Phase II 
and Ellerman et al. (2003) provide a more general treatment that includes other emissions trading programs. 
4 About 100 of the Phase II units opted into and out of Title IV in one or more years of Phase I, but none of 
these units were continuously affected until 2000.  
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Three hundred seventy-four electrical generating units were subject to Title IV 
during all five years of Phase I, including 263 units that were mandated to be subject to 
Title IV beginning in 1995 and another 111 units that voluntarily opted into Phase I for 
all five years. A total of nearly 4,000 unit accounts were subject to Title IV requirements 
in 2000 and 2001, but many of these were for units that were yet to be built and about 
1200 generated little electricity and virtually no emissions. For the purpose of analyzing 
the Phase II response, inclusion of these units provides little information about 
compliance behavior since they account for less than 2% of fossil-fuel heat input and less 
than 0.2% of emissions.5 Instead, and unless otherwise stated the analysis below is based 
on the 374 Phase I units and 1420 Phase II units that can be considered significant either 
because of their generation or their emissions. By definition, the Phase II units are 
smaller and lower emitting units, but they accounted for approximately 45% of 2001 
counterfactual emissions and they received 68% of the allowances.  
While the Phase II units account for the majority of allowances and heat input 
(and therefore generation), they account for a relative small part of the abatement that can 
be attributed to Title IV. The reduction of SO2 emissions in 2001 due to Title IV is 6.3 
million tons of which five-sixths occurred at the Phase I units. As a group, these units 
have reduced emissions by 57%, while the comparable percentage for the Phase II units 
is 14%. As a result, the share of emissions attributable to the Phase I units, the “big 
dirties,” has declined from approximately 55% of the national total to 38%.  
As of 2001, both Phase I and Phase II units are relying upon the accumulated 
Phase I bank of allowances to cover emissions that are higher in the aggregate than the 
2001 allowances allocated to these two categories. The use of the bank is however much 
greater for the Phase I units; their emissions are about 39% higher than the aggregate 
allowance allocation for the Phase I units while the comparable number for the Phase II 
units is 6%.  
 
5 Technically, the criteria for inclusion as a significant unit was having heat input greater than 1 x 1012 Btu 
in two of the seven years, 1995-2001, or heat input greater than 5 x 1012 Btu in any one of those years. For 
a unit with a heat rate of 10,000 Btu/kwh, heat input of 1 x 1012 Btu would generate approximately 100,000 
Mwh in a year, which would imply a 11% capacity factor for a 100 MW unit.   
  
Lessons from Phase 2  4 
May 15, 2003 
 
The Geographic Distribution of Abatement 
Figure 1 show the geographical distribution of abatement in 2000.  
Figure 1. Title IV Emission Reduction by State, 2000 (tons SO2) 
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Eleven states (OH, IN, IL, MO, TN, WV, KY, GA, PA, FL, and AL) account for 90% of 
national abatement. Excluding the three southeastern states of GA, FL, and AL, 77% of 
the abatement is occurring in the Mid-west. This geographic concentration of abatement 
in the Mid-west reflects the predominance of the Phase I units in this region. Virtually all 
of the Phase I units are located east of the Mississippi River and the heaviest 
concentration of emissions prior to enactment of Title IV was in the Mid-west.  
Since Title IV did not require abatement in any specific geographic location, one 
might ask: Why did the abatement occur where it was desired? The increased availability 
and attractiveness of lower sulfur coals in the Midwest provides part of the answer, but an 
equally important cause is the changed incentive structure of cap-and-trade programs. 
Deep abatement technologies, such as scrubbers, are more economic at units where a lot 
of sulfur can be removed, that is, at large units burning high sulfur coal, which in this 
instance were located in the Midwest. When the owners of affected units must pay a price 
(in the form of an allowance surrendered) for every ton of emissions, these large and high 
  
Lessons from Phase 2  5 
May 15, 2003 
 
emitting units will offer the most attractive locations for scrubbers. In fact, 23 of the 30 
retrofitted scrubbers installed in response to Title IV are located in the Midwest.  
By Abatement Technique  
Table 2 provides a breakout of emissions reductions in 2001 by abatement 
technique, that is, whether by scrubbing or switching to lower sulfur fuels. 
Table 2: 2001 Emission Reduction by Technique and Fuel 
000 tons Phase I Units Phase II Units Total 
Scrubbing 2,048  263  2,311  
Fuel Switching 3,215 788 4,003 
Total 5,263 1,051 6,314 
 
Scrubbing accounts for approximately 37% of the abatement in 2001 and virtually all of 
this abatement (1,993,000 tons) comes from new scrubbers installed on 30 Phase I units 
as a result of Title IV.6 These thirty units, located primarily in the Midwest and 
constituting 3% of the generating capacity and 4% of the 2001 heat input at Title IV 
units, accounted for 32% of total abatement. The remaining reductions attributed to 
scrubbing are reductions in excess of the percentage reduction required of scrubbers 
under non-Title IV regulation, which is typically 70% to 90%.   Switching to lower sulfur 
fuels occurred almost exclusively (99.9%) at coal-fired units and it consisted entirely of 
switching to lower sulfur coals. The remaining 0.1% of the emission reduction by 
switching occurred at oil-fired units, which were switched either to lower sulfur 
petroleum products or to natural gas. No coal units have been switched to natural gas 
because the price of natural gas is too high to justify abatement by this means. 
First Year Effect 
One of the most interesting phenomena of both Phase I and Phase II is that the 
largest reduction of emissions was made in the first year that units were subject to Title 
IV, which is to say, the first year in which they were required to pay a price for every ton 
of SO2 emissions. Figures 2 and 3 show this effect for the 374 Phase I units that first 
                                                 
6 27 of these units were installed at the beginning of Phase I. Since 1998, when allowance prices first 
exceeded $200/ton, at least eight new retrofit scrubbers have been announced and three of these were on-
line in 2001.  
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became subject to Title IV in 1995 (by law or through opting-in voluntarily) and have 
been so continuously since then and the Phase II units that became subject to Title IV in 
2000.  
Figure 2.  Phase I unit emissions, allowances and counterfactual emissions   
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Figure 3. Phase II unit emissions, allowances, and counterfactual emissions 
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In both of these figures, the red line beginning in 1985 and continuing through 
2001 depicts the evolution of actual SO2 emissions; the lines beginning in 1995 in Figure 
2 and in 2000 in Figure 3 and continuing to the right-hand side of each figure represents 
the total number of allowances issued to these units for each year; and the shorter line 
consisting of seven points in Figure 2 and two points in Figure 3 provides an estimate of 
counterfactual emissions, what emissions would have been for these units if Title IV had 
not been in force.  The notable feature for each subset of generating units is the large 
reduction in emissions that is observed in the first year that Title IV took effect.  
This first-year effect is particularly striking for the Phase I units. A steady decline 
in the trend of emissions can be observed in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but the 
reduction from 1994 to 1995 was much greater than any year-to-year decline observed 
before.7 Title IV occasioned this sharp one-year decline; there simply is no other 
explanation. It is the more remarkable in that it can be seen as completely voluntary, at 
least with respect to the timing of the emission reduction since the total number of 
allowances issued for 1995 was in fact not very constraining. 
The first-year effect is not as large in absolute or percentage terms for the Phase II 
units because these relatively low emission units contribute less to the aggregate 
emissions, but it is still noticeable. The start of Phase II broke what had been a steady 
upward trend in SO2 emissions for these units that contrasts with the pre-Title IV trend 
for the Phase I units. In 2000, aggregate emissions for Phase II units were virtually the 
same as the number of allowances issued to these units, but the pattern beneath the 
aggregate is highly variable. Approximately 60% of the Phase II units receive more 
allowances than needed to cover calculate counterfactual (and generally actual) 
emissions; the surplus is effectively transferred to other Phase II units, generally located 
east of the Mississippi, that received fewer allowances than those unit’s pre-Title IV and 
estimated 2000 counterfactual, emissions.8 
 
7 Ellerman and Montero (1998) the declining trend in SO2 emission prior to the onset of Phase I to the 
deregulation of railroads which made low sulfur western coal cheap in the Midwest. The appendix by 
Schennach in Ellerman et al. (2000) provides an econometric estimate that separates the amount of pre-
1995 decline due to railroad deregulation and to anticipation of Title IV. 
8 Counterfactual emissions are calculated as the product of the observed, pre-Title IV emission rate and 
actual heat input for the year in question. For instance, 2000 counterfactual emissions for any given unit is 
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BANKING 
One of the prominent features of Phase I was the accumulation of a bank of 
allowances that totaled 11.65 million tons at the end of 1999.  Although most observers 
believed that these allowances would be used during the first decade of Phase II, it was 
never clear whether the amount of banking in Phase I was the result of reasonably 
rational banking programs implemented by the owners of Phase I affected units, which is 
to say, whether the level of banking was economically justified..  
The effect of Phase II on Phase I unit emissions 
One important sign that the owners of Phase I affected units have been engaging 
in reasonably rational banking behavior is provided by the change in total emissions from 
these units between 1999 and 2000, when the allocation of allowances for these units was 
reduced by about 50%. Economic agents who engage in reasonably efficient banking 
programs would ignore year-to-year changes in the number of allowances allocated and 
abate according to a banking program based on the cumulative required emission 
reduction over the relevant economic horizon—essentially smoothing abatement over 
time.  
Figure 2 shows that the 56% reduction in allowances from 1999 to 2000 had little 
effect on emissions, which declined by 8% between the two years. The only change from 
1999 to 2000 was the change in the banking position of these units; in 1999 they 
continued to bank allowances and in 2000 they started to draw down the accumulated 
Phase I bank..  The general shape in the trajectory of emissions, and in the net changes to 
the bank, is what would be predicted by economic theory when agents are able to 
redistribute emissions over time in a cost-minimizing fashion and they are faced with a 
sharp discontinuity in the temporal allocation of allowances (Schennach, 2000).  
Optimality of Banking 
The smooth path of aggregate emissions from Phase I units and the concomitant 
start of the draw down of the accumulated allowance bank does not imply that banking 
                                                                                                                                                 
the product of that unit’s 1998 emission rate and its 2000 heat input. Aggregate counterfactual emissions 
for any year is calculated by summing all the individual units. 
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behavior has been optimal, although it does eliminate the possibility of irrational 
hoarding, a common concern in the early days of Title IV. Any judgment on temporal 
efficiency requires that an appropriate discount rate be chosen, which is a non-trivial task. 
The usual assumption has been that the owners of electric utilities would use an 
internal discount rate reflecting their weighted cost of capital; yet, finance theory is clear 
that the cash flows associated with certain projects or assets should be discounted by a 
rate reflecting the degree of undiversifiable risk, that is, the extent to which the returns 
from a particular type of asset vary with the returns from a well diversified portfolio of 
equities, such as the S&P 500. By the Capital Asset Pricing Model, the appropriate 
discount rate is the sum of the risk-free rate, associated with Treasury bills or notes, and a 
risk premium that depends on the asset’s “beta,” which is the slope of the line regressing 
the returns from the particular type of asset on the returns from a well-diversified 
portfolio of equities over a succession of periods. The empirically observed additional 
return associated with a well-diversified portfolio of equities (in comparison with T-bills 
for instance) is known as the equity premium for the undiversifiable risk of such a 
portfolio. The appropriate discount rate for any specific asset, such as SO2 allowances, is 
then the risk-free rate plus the product of the asset’s beta and the market equity premium.  
For example, a beta of 1.0 implies that on average the percentage returns from the 
specific asset (defined as the change in price of the asset plus any dividend payment) are 
the same as the general equity market; and lower or higher betas imply a lower or higher 
discount rate for the cash flows associated with the specific asset. 
The capital asset pricing model is useful because it provides a means for 
determining the appropriate discount rate for any asset that is priced in some market. SO2 
allowances are financial assets whose ultimate value depends on the abatement costs 
avoided by their use for covering emissions in some period. They are also bought and 
sold in what appears to be a reasonably efficient market so that the returns from holding 
SO2 allowances can be easily calculated and compared to those from holding a well-
diversified portfolio of equities. Such a comparison is made in Figure 4 for the period 
from October 1994 through March 2003. 
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Figure 4. Returns from holding SO2 Allowances and the S&P500 
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The straight, slightly upward sloping line is the regression line, and its slope indicates the 
beta, which is statistically insignificantly different from zero. This result indicates that no 
correlation exists between the monthly returns from SO2 allowances and the S&P500.9 
When the return from holding a diversified portfolio for some period is positive, the 
return from holding an SO2 allowance in the same period is as likely to be negative as it 
is to be positive.  Equivalently, SO2 allowances constitute a zero-beta asset and this result 
implies that the appropriate discount rate for SO2 allowances is the risk-free rate.10  
It would take this paper to far afield to delve into the construction of an 
appropriate discount rate for SO2 allowances, such as how to determine the risk-free rate 
and over what period of time; however, the result of that analysis, as developed more 
fully in Ellerman and Montero (2002), is given in Figure 5. 
                                                 
9 Regressions on different market indices, for differing periods of time, and with corrections for serial 
correlation give similar results. 
10 It must be emphasized that the risk that is measured is systemic or undiversifiable risk, not asset specific 
risk. The latter can be reduced and avoided by constructing a portfolio with an appropriate weighting of 
assets whose returns are negatively correlated with the specific risk being diversified.  
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Figure 5. Simulation of optimal Title IV banking 
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The five peaked lines extending from 1995 through varying years in Phase II represent 
optimal aggregate bank holdings depending on plausible assumptions concerning 
discount rates and the expected growth of SO2 emissions over the banking period. The 
fuzzy line that runs through 2001 represents actual aggregate bank holdings and it closely 
tracks the optimal path for a real discount rate of 4.0% and an expected growth of 
emissions of 0.65%. These are in fact reasonable assumptions for the real risk-free 
discount rate from the mid-1990s through 2001 and for pre-1995 expectations of 
expected SO2 emissions growth without Title IV.  However, the important point is not 
that the actual path tracks this particular line, but that it falls within the paths described 
by alternative plausible assumptions concerning real risk-free discount rates—3.0% and 
5.0%—and for the growth of counterfactual emissions—0% and 1.25% per annum. The 
real risk-free discount rate varies over time, as do expectations of expected growth in 
counterfactual emissions, but these bounds fairly describe the variation in these 
parameters since Title IV began.  
It would be too much to claim that banking has been optimal in any exact sense, 
but the lines in Figure 5 describe the range of reasonably efficient banking programs 
given reasonable assumptions about the most important parameters determining banking 
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behavior.  The envelope described by these banking programs would predict an end-of-
Phase I bank of between 9.5 million tons and 13.5 million tons and the complete draw 
down of the bank sometime between 2008 and 2013. This envelope is consistent with 
what has been observed and what is expected, assuming no changes to Title IV during the 
remainder of the banking period. In summary, the response to the banking provisions of 
Title IV provides further evidence economic agents respond in a rational, cost-
minimizing way when market-based incentives are made available.       
NEW UNITS 
A frequently maligned feature of Title IV is the endowment of allowances to 
incumbents (as of 1985-87) without any provision for allowances to new entrants.  This 
feature is often decried as a barrier to entry for new generating units, an issue of 
particular concern when wholesale power markets are deregulated.  This feature of Title 
IV could not be observed in Phase I, since existing plants only were included. However, 
any new fossil-fuel-fired generating unit of more than 25 MWe that has come on line 
since enactment of the legislation in 1990 would be covered in Phase II, so that this effect 
can now be observed.11   
One way to evaluate the effect on new units is to observe the frequency of 
generating units that were not allocated allowances. Zero-allowance units are not 
necessarily new units since re-activated, mothballed units not operating in 1985-87 would 
also not receive allowances, and there were some of these. Nevertheless, all new units 
would be zero-allowance units and the crux of the argument about barriers to entry 
concerns the absence of an allowance allocation.  Of the nearly 3,000 units subject to 
reconciliation and emitting some SO2 during 2000-2001, 981 are zero-allowance units, 
almost a third. This large number reflects mostly the increase in new gas-fired capacity 
that has been observed in 2000 and 2001. 
Table 3 provides an accounting of these zero-allowance units by the time when 
they first appeared as generating units. In this presentation, a division is made between 
 
11 A few units that were in the planning stage in 1990 received contingent allowance allocations in the Title 
IV legislation. In the following analysis, three of these units that were operating in 2000 and 2001 have 
been excluded.  
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Phase II units that make a significant contribution to heat input or emissions (1420 units), 
which have been cited above, and the remaining units (1200) with small contributions to 
aggregate heat input (1-2% of the total) and emissions (≈ 0.2%). Since many of the new 
units were used for peaking purposes only or were only starting up as combined cycles in 
2001, any assessment of the role of zero-allocation units must include these  “remaining” 
or “insignificant” Phase II units. 
Table 3. Zero-allowance Phase II units, by time of first generation 
 Significant Units Remaining Units Total Phase II 
Online prior to 2000 109 264 373 
New in 2000 34 189 123 
New in 2001 31 354 385 
Total 174 807 981 
   
Nearly all of the zero-allowance units are new, gas-fired peaking or combined cycle units 
that emit little SO2, but a small number are not. In 2001, 61 units had an average emission 
rate higher than 0.05 lbs/SO2 per mmBtu, which implies they were burning a petroleum 
product or coal; and 20 emitted more than 100 tons of SO2 during the year.  These small 
numbers might be used to argue that the absence of an allowance endowment 
discouraged new coal or oil capacity, but it is more likely that the compelling economics 
of gas-fired peaking and combined cycle generation (at least before the recent and 
persistent higher price levels for natural gas) explain this phenomenon. At the very least, 
it is evident that the lack of an allowance endowment does not impede the entry of new 
low-emitting generation capacity. 
Quite apart from the issue of barriers to entry, the new gas-fired units have had a 
significant effect on SO2 emissions. The year 2001 was the first year since 1992 in which 
the heat input into fossil fuel fired generating units declined thereby breaking what had 
been an eight-year succession of rising demand for fossil-fuels for the generation of 
electricity. The 3.2% decline in heat input from 2000 to 2001was the more remarkable in 
that fossil fuel fired generation of electricity in these two years was approximately 
  
Lessons from Phase 2  14 
May 15, 2003 
 
constant. The explanation lies in the significant increment of new gas-fired combined 
cycle generating capacity that came on line in 2001.   
The differing trends in fossil-fuel fired generation and fossil-fuel heat input due to 
the new combined cycle units emerges clearly from the latest EIA data, as shown in 
Table 4. 
Table 4: Generation and Heat Input at Fossil-fuel fired Generating Units, 1999-2001 
 1999 % Chg 2000 % Chg 2001 
Generation (000 Gwh) 2,578 +4.31% 2,689 +0.07% 2,691 
   Coal 1,884 +4.46% 1,968 -2.79% 1,913 
   Oil/Gas 694 +3.89% 721 +7.90% 778 
Heat Input (Quads) 23.45 +2.22% 23.97 -3.46% 23.14 
   Coal 19.33 +3.93% 20.09 -2.59% 19.57 
   Oil/Gas 4.12 -5.83% 3.88 -7.99% 3.57 
Implied Efficiency 
All Units  +2.04%  +3.66%  
   Coal Units  +0.51%  -0.21%  
   Oil/Gas Units  +10.32%  +17.27%  
Source:  EIA, Monthly Energy Review, February 2003 
The effect of the new combined cycle units can be seen in the statistics for implied 
efficiency, which is the change of generation divided by the change in heat input. For 
instance, in comparing 2001 with 2000, fossil-fuel fired generation increased by less than 
.1% and heat input declined by 3.5%, which implies an improvement in efficiency of 
3.66%. As can be seen from the decomposition by fuel, all of this comes from the oil/gas 
fired units. The efficiency of the coal units has been relatively constant in the aggregate, 
but the oil/gas generating units have improved in aggregate efficiency by about 10% in 
2000 and 17% in 2001. The result in 2001, when demand for electricity was flat, has been 
a backing out of the coal units (-2.8%) and an increase in oil/gas generation (+7.9%). The 
improvement in efficiency also implies less demand for natural gas for generating 
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electricity, a trend that is clearly evident in the EIA statistics (-8.0% from 2000 to 
2001).12 
The effect of the new gas-fired combined cycle generating units can be readily 
observed when the annual changes in emissions at generating units are decomposed into 
changes in emission rates at individual units, caused by fuel switching, and changes in 
heat input at those units. Table 5 provides an accounting of the changes in SO2 emissions 
from 1999 to 2000 and from 2000 to 2001 by summing the observed changes at all 
affected generating units.  
Table 5. Changes in SO2 emissions by fuel and cause 
000 tons SO2 All Units Coal Units Oil/Gas Units 
1999-2000 Changes - 1,254 - 1,132 - 122 
  Emission Rate Changes - 1,392 - 1,382 - 10 
  Heat Input Changes + 138 + 250 - 109 
2000-2001 Changes - 567 - 649 + 83 
  Emission Rate Changes - 64 - 135 + 71 
  Heat Input Changes - 503 - 514 + 12 
Source: Derived from EPA CEMS data 
The source of SO2 reductions changes dramatically from the comparison of 1999 with 
2000 and 2000 with 2001. All of the reduction in emissions from 1999 to 2000 can be 
attributed to an average lowering of emission rates at affected units, mostly by switching 
to lower sulfur fuels. This change is the first-year effect that has been discussed earlier: 
the downward shift in emission rates that occurs when units are first required to pay a 
price for all emissions. In contrast, nearly all of the reduction from 2000 to 2001 is due to 
lower heat input at affected units, which reflects the influx of new combined cycle 
                                                 
12 The heat input data from the CEMS (Continuous Emissions Monitoring System) data collected by EPA 
confirms the general trend but not the magnitudes of improved generation efficiency for oil/gas units. For 
instance the CEMS data show oil/gas unit heat input to have increased by 2.7% from 2000 to 2001, instead 
of declining by 8.0%, as the EIA data indicate. A 2.7% increase in heat input would still imply some 
improvement in efficiency, given the increase in gas-fired generation, but not 17%. There are obvious 
problems of comparability concerning oil and gas units. While the EIA and EPA statistics agree closely 
with respect to heat input into coal-fired units, the disagreement for oil/gas fired units is large. EIA reports 
3.57 quads of oil and gas heat input in 2001, while the EPA CEMS indicates 4.85 quads of oil and gas heat 
input, or 36% more. 
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capacity and the resultant backing out of coal-fired and single cycle oil and gas-fired 
generation. Had the new combined cycle units not been brought on line, the demand for 
electricity would have been met by existing generating capacity and SO2 emissions would 
have been about 500,000 tons, or about 5%, higher than they were. 
COST 
No estimates of the actual cost of compliance with Title IV in Phase II have been 
made; however, two groups of analysts made ex post estimates of the cost of compliance 
in Phase I and both provided updated estimates of the expected cost in Phase II based on 
observed Phase I cost. These estimates of Phase II cost can be now be assessed based on 
the observed abatement in Phase II and allowance price behavior. The two ex-post 
evaluations of Phase I compliance cost were made by Carlson et al. (2000) and Ellerman 
et al. (2000) [hereafter, CBCP for the initials of the authors of Carlson et al. and MCA for 
Markets for Clean Air, the title of the book published by Ellerman et al.]  
CBCP and MCA agree roughly on the cost of compliance in the early years of the 
Acid Rain Program. The latter estimates the cost of compliance at $726 million in 1995 
and about $750 million in 1996, while the former places the cost at $832 million in 1995 
and $910 million in 1996, all stated in 1995 dollars. These estimates are not as far apart 
as they would seem. Complete comparability is not possible because of differences in 
methodology; however, both treat scrubber expense in the same manner.13 Although they 
largely agree on the fixed cost of scrubbers ($375 million in MCA and $382 million in 
CBCP), they differ significantly on the variable costs associated with scrubbers ($89 in 
MCA million and $274 million in CBCP).14 CBCP uses scrubber data that reflect pre-
1995 estimates of the variable cost of scrubbing, but the actual performance of the Phase 
I scrubbers has been much better than predicted. Correction of this item alone largely 
 
13  MCA provides a bottom-up, plant-by-plant analysis based on reported capital costs and observed sulfur 
premia. CBCP conducts an econometric estimation of a translog cost function and share equations of unit-
level data for 734 non-scrubbed units over the 1985-94 period and then takes the resulting parameter values 
to form marginal abatement cost functions for individual units, which are then used to estimate actual costs 
based on observed 1995-96 emission levels. Scrubbed units are handled separately on a cost accounting 
basis using identical cost of capital and depreciation assumptions as in Ellerman et al. (2000).  
14 The numbers cited from CBCP are from their break-out of the costs of 2010 compliance. This estimate 
will be approximately the same as the scrubber costs in 1995-96 since the fixed costs are annualized over 
20 years, fuel costs are assumed not to change after 1995, the number of scrubbers is assumed to remain 
unchanged, and costs are stated in 1995 dollars.  
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removes the disparity in cost estimates between these two ex post evaluations. As an 
approximate figure, $750 million is probably a reasonable estimate of the annual cost of 
abatement in the first years of Phase I.  
A simple estimate of Phase II cost can be obtained by extrapolation of this 
estimate using the increase in the amount abatement observed and the behavior of 
allowance prices, which can be taken as a reasonable indication of short and long-run 
costs of abatement. The estimate of $750 million for early Phase I costs corresponds to 
about 4.0 million tons of abatement, while currently observed abatement is about 6.5 
million tons, or 63% more. Although three new retrofitted scrubbers were operating as of 
2001, most of the 2.5 million tons of additional abatement since 1995 has occurred 
through switching to lower sulfur coal. Allowance prices provide a good proxy for the 
per ton cost of this additional abatement since there is every indication that utilities 
recognize that allowances are perfect substitutes for abatement at the margin and act 
accordingly.  
After an initial downward adjustment, allowance prices have moved generally 
upward, as would be predicted for agents engaged in reasonably rational banking 
programs; and since early 1998, prices have ranged from highs of about $210 to lows of 
about $130.  In addition, the significant observed reduction in scrubber cost has brought 
the total costs of scrubbing within the upper end of the range of allowance prices since 
1998.15 Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the increment total cost of the additional 
abatement observed since 1995-96 lies between $150 and $200 a ton.  This implies an 
additional total cost of abatement between $375 million and $500 million (2.5 million 
tons of additional abatement times $150/ton and $200/ton, respectively) and a total 
estimated cost for early Phase II abatement of between $1.125 billion and $1.25 billion. 
Since another 1.5 million tons is to be abated as the Phase I allowance bank is drawn 
down, total annual costs for compliance with the completely phased-in Phase II limits 
would be about $1.5 billion assuming an incremental per ton cost of $200.  
 
15 Ellerman and Joskow (forthcoming) provide a discussion of the evolution of estimates of scrubbing costs 
and estimates of the cost of scrubbing the remaining unscrubbed coal units. Taylor et al. (2001) also 
provide estimates of the decline in scrubber costs since the early 1970s. 
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By any reckoning, these estimated costs, made with the benefit of observed data 
and trends, are lower than the ex ante predictions when Title IV was enacted. Most of the 
often noted disparity between ex ante and ex post estimates of the cost of the Acid Rain 
Program reflects very different assumptions about the nature of proposed acid rain 
controls, the projected demand for electricity, and the relative availability and cost of low 
sulfur coal. For instance, the total annual costs associated with some of the early 
proposals to control acid rain precursor emissions were estimated at amounts ranging 
from $3.5 to $7.5 billion, 2 to 5 times what now appear likely to be the cost of a fully 
phased-in program. Although the details of these earlier proposals varied, they generally 
mandated scrubbers at a significant number of units and allowed very limited emissions 
trading. Once the proposal that ultimately became Title IV was proposed (in 1989) and 
enacted (in 1990), the ex ante cost estimates for the fully phased-in program with trading 
fell to a range from $2.3 billion to $6.0 billion, with most of this variation reflecting 
varying assumptions about the extent to which emissions trading would be used.  
A good example is provided by the discussion in MCA (pp. 231-235) of the few 
ex ante estimates of Phase I costs and a comparison with the MCA estimate of actual 
cost. Most of the variation in the ex ante estimates, made only a few years before Phase I 
began, reflects differing assumptions about the extent to which utilities made full use of 
the flexibility afforded by emissions trading. When compared on an average cost basis to 
account for differences in assumptions about the quantity of abatement (due to differing 
assumptions about the growth in electricity demand and the extent of banking), MCA’s 
ex post estimate of cost in 1995 was slightly above (3-15%) ex ante estimates assuming 
full use of emissions trading and 20-35% below estimates that assumed relatively little 
use of emissions trading. 
CBCP provides a very helpful quantification of the causes of the change between 
the early estimates of fully phased-in Title IV costs and the current estimates. In 
analyzing the causes for the change between expected costs as of the mid-1980s and 
actual costs in early Phase I, CBCP find that the marginal cost of abatement for a 
representative generating unit has been approximately halved and that 80% of the 
reduction in cost is attributable to falling price of low-sulfur coal relative to the price of 
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high sulfur coal and that the remaining 20% is attributable to technological change. 
Estimates of fully phased-in Phase II costs are then made using different assumptions 
about coal prices, technological change, and the use of trading, as illustrated in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Simulated Total Cost of Compliance with Title IV in 2010 
(billion 1995 dollars) 
Cost Assumptions Command-and-Control Efficient Trading 
1989 Prices and Technology $2.67 $1.90 
1995 Prices and Technology $2.23 $1.51 
1995 Prices and 2010 Technology $1.82 $1.04 
Source: Carlson et al. (2000), Table 2, p. 1313 
 
Since efficient trading is being observed, the relevant estimate for Phase II cost from this 
study lies between $1.04 billion and $1.51 billion, depending upon the amount of 
technological progress from 1995 to 2010. The estimate of $1.5 billion presented above 
lies at the upper end of this range, but it does not attempt to estimate further 
improvements in abatement technology. Even so, this table shows that, while costs 
depend on prices and technology, which are not subject to program design, the ability to 
trade, which is subject to program design, can lead to equally and even more significant 
reductions in the cost of compliance.  
In summary, it seems clear that Phase II costs are considerably lower than what 
was expected and that this difference is attributable to 1) the flexibility allowed by Title 
IV, 2) improvements in abatement technology, especially in scrubbers, and 3) the lower 
prices for low sulfur coal due largely to changes independent of Title IV. As detailed in 
Ellerman and Montero (1998), the most important independent change was the reduction 
in rail rates that made low sulfur bituminous coals from the West economically attractive 
as a replacement for high sulfur, Midwestern bituminous coal and significantly reduced 
the abatement requirements imposed by the Title IV cap. 
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CONCLUSION 
With two years of Phase II compliance data now available (and a third year’s data 
about to be released), more confident answers concerning the effectiveness of cap-and-
trade systems can be made. Although not discussed in this paper, nothing suggests that 
allowance markets are working less efficiently in Phase II than in Phase I; and there is 
plenty of anecdotal evidence to suggest that the owners of Title IV affected units are 
avoiding whatever less than optimal abatement choices may have been made in Phase I. 
The more important evidence arising from Phase II compliance concerns the distribution 
of total abatement, the efficiency of banking, the extent to which lack of an allowance 
endowment impedes the entry of new generating units, and not least the total cost of 
compliance. This evidence provides the basis for the following tentative conclusions. 
1. By far, the bulk of the abatement by Title IV affected units is being made by the 
Phase I units that, by definition, are the larger units with relatively high pre-Title 
IV emission levels, located mostly in the Midwest. About three-quarters of the 
reduction in SO2 emissions due to Title IV is occurring in this region of the 
country and this share is larger that that region’s share of electricity generation or 
pre-Title IV emissions. This pattern of abatement implies that the cheapest 
abatement lies where emissions are greatest and that market-based incentives can 
be expected to direct abatement to these locations. 
2. The amount of banking undertaken in Phase I and the rate of draw down in Phase 
II has been reasonably efficient. The observed response to the sharp discontinuity 
in marginal cost created by the two phases of Title IV suggests that, when 
banking is allowed, agents take a longer view and distribute abatement efficiently 
over time. This behavior also implies a non-mandated acceleration in the timing 
of the required cumulative abatement that is environmentally beneficial.  
3. There is little evidence in Phase II that failing to endow new generating capacity 
with allowances impedes entry. While a frequently voiced complaint, and perhaps 
unfair in some non-economic sense, the practical realities are that neither short-
run nor long-run marginal calculations concerning production or entry are 
affected by the allowance endowments in Title IV. Moreover, SO2 allowance cost 
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is a relatively minor consideration when compared with permitting and siting 
costs and new source performance requirements. 
4. While detailed studies of Phase II compliance cost have not been performed, 
reasonable extrapolations from carefully done earlier analyses of Phase I cost 
continue to indicate that the fully phased in cost of Title IV is and will be 
significantly lower than expected, somewhere between $1.0 billion, at the very 
lowest, and perhaps $1.5 billion at the high end. Much of the explanation for the 
disparity with the much higher ex ante forecasts lies in differing assumptions 
about the rate of improvement in abatement technology and other changes in the 
coal sector that are largely independent of Title IV; however, a significant share 
of the disparity can be attributed to the flexibility provided by Title IV and 
electric utilities’ willingness to take advantage of the cost-saving opportunities 
provided by emissions trading.  
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